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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON IMPLEMENTABILITY AND MONOTONICITY
Pelin Pasin
Ph.D. Department of Economics
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Semih Koray
September, 2009
In this thesis we study the implementation problem with regard to the rela-
tion between monotonicity and implementability. Recent work in the field has
shown that the implementability of a social choice rule strongly depends upon
the compatibility between the monotonicity structures of the social choice rule
and of the solution concept according to which implementation takes place.
Different degrees of monotonicity of the social choice rules and game theoretic
solution concepts can be determined via a generalized monotonicity function,
strongest of which is called self-monotonicity. In this study, we determine
the unique self-monotonicity of the Nash equilibrium concept and show that
the monotonicities of a social choice rule are inherited from the unique self-
monotonicity of the Nash equilibrium concept via the mechanisms that imple-
ment it. In particular, we show that the essential monotonicity is inherited via
the Maskin-Vind type mechanism which is widely used in the characterization
results. We also give a new characterization of strong Nash implementable
social choice rules via critical profiles. We show that coalitional monotonicity
when conjoined with three more conditions is both necessary and sufficient
for implementability. Finally we determine a subset of subgame perfect Nash
implementable social choice rules that satisfies conditions defined obtained by
critical profiles. The results that are obtained in this thesis strongly support
the view that implementation theory can be rewritten in terms of monotonicity
and that this provides a better understanding of the theory.
Keywords: Implementation, Monotonicity, Self-monotonicity, Critical Profiles.
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ÖZET
UYGULANABİLİRLİK VE TEKDÜZELİK 
ÜZERİNE ÇALIŞMALAR
Pasin, Pelin
Doktora, İktisat Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Semih Koray
Eylül 2009
Bu  tezde,  tekdüzelik  ve  uygulanabilirlik  arasındaki  ilişki  bağlamında  uygulama 
problemi  çalışılmıştır.  Güncel  çalışmalar,  bir  sosyal  seçim  kuralının 
uygulanabilirliğinin,  uygulanacak  sosyal  seçim  kuralının  sahip  olduğu  tekdüzelik 
yapılarıyla  uygulamanın  gerçekleşeceği  çözüm  kavramının  tekdüzelik  yapıları 
arasındaki uyumluluğa bağlı olduğunu göstermiştir. Sosyal seçim kurallarının ve oyun 
kuramsal çözüm kavramlarının, genelleştirilmiş bir tekdüzelik fonksiyonu aracılığıyla, 
en  kuvvetlisinin  öz-tekdüzelik  olarak  adlandırıldığı,  değişik  tekdüzelik  dereceleri 
tanımlanabilir.  Bu  çalışmada,  Nash  denge  kavramının  öz-tekdüzeliği  tek  biçimde 
belirlenmiştir ve bir sosyal seçim kuralının tekdüzeliklerinin, Nash denge kavramının 
bu  öz-tekdüzeliğinden,  uygulayan  mekanizmalar  aracılığıyla  taşındığı  gösterilmiştir. 
Özellikle,  temel  tekdüzeliğin  Maskin-Vind  tarzı  mekanizmalar  aracılığıyla  taşındığı 
gösterilmitir.  Ayrıca,  kuvvetli  Nash uygulanabilir  seçim kurallarının  kritik  profiller 
aracılığıyla  yeni  bir  karakterizasyonu  yapılmıştir.  Son  olarak,  üstyetkin  denge 
uygulanabilir seçim kuralları için yeni yeter şartlar tanımlanmıştır. Bu tezde elde edilen 
sonuçlar, uygulama kuramının tekdüzelik cinsinden yeniden yazılabileceği ve bunun 
kuramı daha iyi anlamak için önemli olduğu görüşünü güçlü bir şekilde destekler. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Uygulama, Tekdüzelik, Öz-tekdüzelik, Kritik profiller.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In many economic and social situations, decisions must be made whose out-
comes affect the agents in the society. Often it is desirable to make such
decisions by taking into account the preferences of each agent who will di-
rectly or indirectly be subjected to the consequences of these decisions. Social
choice theory is concerned with the various rules that take agents’ preferences
over a set of alternatives and return a collective decision. Social choice theory
studies the merits and flaws of different rules in different situations and, as a
result, attempts to determine which rules are best suited to be applied in these
situations.
Achieving a collective decision by using a predetermined social choice rule
is only possible on the assumption that the agents’ preferences are known by
the central authority (social planner) who is going to employ the social choice
rule. In most real life cases the central authority does not have this informa-
tion. Sometimes it is not possible to collect all this information because of
physical constraints. When it is possible, asking agents their preferences di-
rectly may seem to be a natural way to overcome this problem. However, there
is no guarantee that the agents will state their true preferences. Especially in
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situations where they have information about others’ preferences, they may
have an incentive to change the outcome by stating false preferences.
Economic institutions can be viewed as coordination mechanisms via which
information from the agents in a society is communicated and processed to
achieve socially desirable outcomes. Taking this view, Hurwicz (1960, 1972),
in two highly influential papers, developed an analytic framework for the study
of economic institutions. Hurwicz’s formalization gave precision to many of the
concepts that had been used in a long standing debate on how to organize mar-
kets and make social decisions. Furthermore, he incorporated the incentives
problem mentioned above into his formalization. In search of a better analysis
and understanding of economic institutions, Hurwicz provided a mathematical
foundation for mechanism design and introduced incentive compatibility.
A mechanism has two components; a joint message space and an outcome
function. Each agent is endowed with a set of messages which identifies the
possible actions that the agent can take. The outcome function assigns to
each joint message received from all the agents, an outcome from the set of
alternatives. When combined with the preferences of the agents over the al-
ternatives, this construction leads to a normal form game. A game theoretic
solution concept that reflects the mode of behavior of the agents can then be
used to specify the equilibria of the game. In contrast to game theory, in mech-
anism design, a game is not a given structure but rather something to design
to obtain a socially desirable outcome. Hurwicz’s formulation of the design
problem puts emphasis on two issues; informational efficiency and incentive
compatibility. The informational efficiency of a mechanism is determined by
the size of its message space and the complexity of computing each message.
A mechanism is incentive compatible if it is immune to manipulation by the
agents.
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Implementation theory studies an abstract generalization of the design
problem. A mechanism is said to implement a social choice rule in a so-
lution concept if the equilibrium outcomes of each game at each preference
profile coincide with the alternatives that are chosen by the social choice rule
at each preference profile. A social choice rule is said to be implementable in
a solution concept if there exists a mechanism that implements it. As the true
preferences of the agents are not observable to the central authority (social
planner) the implementing mechanism identifies the outcome at each possible
profile. Implementation theory is concerned with determining the properties
that should be satisfied by a social choice rule to be implemented in a solution
concept. When each agent has complete information about the preferences of
the others, it is natural to consider Nash equilibrium and its refinements for
implementation. Maskin was the first to show which social choice rules can
be implemented in Nash equilibrium. In his seminal paper, Maskin (1977)
introduced a condition called “monotonicity” and showed that every Nash im-
plementable social choice rule satisfies monotonicity. He also showed that when
there are three or more agents, a social choice rule is Nash implementable if it
satisfies monotonicity and no veto power. A social choice rule is monotonic if
any alternative that is chosen at a preference profile is also chosen at all the
profiles where the chosen alternative’s ranking relative to any other alternative
doesn’t get worse from the view point of each agent. The lower contour set
of an alternative for an agent is the set of alternatives that are preferred less
than or equally to this alternative. Then, a social choice rule is monotonic, if
any alternative that is chosen at a preference profile is also chosen at all the
profiles where the chosen alternative’s lower contour set is preserved for each
agent. A social choice rule satisfies no veto power if, when all but one agent
top ranks the same alternative, then this alternative is chosen.
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The full characterization of Nash implementable social choice rules was first
given by Moore and Repullo (1990). Their characterization result is based on
the existence of a system of sets which satisfies some specific properties. They
consider a Nash implementable social choice rule. At each preference profile
they look at the set of alternatives that each agent can attain by unilateral
deviation. By the definition of Nash equilibrium, at each profile for each agent
these sets should be a subset of the lower contour set of the alternative that is
chosen. They identified three conditions on these sets which should be satisfied
by a Nash implementable social choice rule. The first is a strengthening of
monotonicity and the other two are a weakening of no veto power. They then
show that the existence of a system of sets satisfying these conditions is also
sufficient for Nash implementability.
Danilov (1992) introduced essential monotonicity and showed that it is
both necessary and sufficient for Nash implementability when the domain of the
social choice rule consists of all possible orderings of the alternatives. Essential
monotonicity is stronger than monotonicity. While in monotonicity the lower
contour sets should be preserved, in essential monotonicity only the “essential
elements” in the lower contour sets should be preserved. A weaker version
of no veto power is embedded in the definition of an essential element. The
sets of essential elements constitute a system of sets that satisfy Moore and
Repullo’s condition. Danilov’s rather direct approach makes it much easier to
check whether a social choice rule is implementable.1
The significance of monotonicity for implementability was supported by
Danilov’s result. A deeper understanding of the relation between monotonicity
and implementability was provided by Kaya and Koray (2000). They proved
1The conditions that are mentioned for both characterization results are necessary and
sufficient when there are at least three agents. When there are only two agents they both
introduced additional conditions for implementability.
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that the monotonicity properties of the social choice rules implementable in
a particular solution concept are inherited from the monotonicity properties
inherent to the solution concept itself, and they characterized the solution
concepts which only implement monotonic social choice rules.
The notion of self-monotonicity which is introduced by Koray (2002) is
based on these observations. As he puts it, regarding monotonicity as the
preservation of an order structure on the domain of a social rule, it is natural to
introduce different degrees of monotonicity in accordance with the strength of
the order structure that is preserved. Roughly, a self-monotonicity for a social
choice rule is the strongest monotonicity condition that it satisfies; meaning
that the social choice rule fails to satisfy a stronger condition. This generaliza-
tion easily carries over to the inheritance theorem by Kaya and Koray (2000)
in the following way: a self-monotonicity of a social choice rule implementable
in a particular solution concept must be inherited from a self-monotonicity
inherent to the solution concept itself.
A dual approach to the implementation problem is expressed by the notion
of a “critical profile.” It was first introduced in a study by Koray, Adali, Erol,
and Ordulu (2001) where they provided a simpler proof of the well known
Mu¨ller-Satterthwaite theorem vial critical profiles. In another study Dog˘an
and Koray (2007) explored more social choice theoretic implications of the
notion and also provided a new characterization for two-person Nash imple-
mentable social choice rules. Roughly, a critical profile for an alternative a is
a preference profile at which a is chosen and which has the following property:
at any preference profile that is obtained from the critical profile by a reversal
of an ordering between a and any alternative that is less preferred than a from
the view point of some agent, a is not chosen by the social choice rule.
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In this thesis, we further explore the relation of monotonicity and critical
profiles to implementability. First, as an example to the inheritance property
mentioned above we identify the self-monotonicity of the Nash equilibrium
concept and determine the monotonicities that are inherited by Nash imple-
mentable social choice rules which are not necessarily self-monotonicities. The
Nash equilibrium concept has a unique self-monotonicity which is carried over
to the social choice rule via the mechanism that implements it. As there
may be several mechanisms that implement a social choice rule the unique
self-monotonicity of the Nash equilibrium concept may induce several mono-
tonicities for the social choice rule. The smaller the size of the message space
of the implementing mechanism, the stronger the monotonicity inherited. The
self-monotonicity that is carried over by Maskin-Vind type mechanisms, which
are commonly used in the characterization results of Nash implementability,
turns out to be the essential monotonicity of Danilov.
Second, we consider the strong Nash equilibrium concept which incorpo-
rates coalitional deviations. It is more appropriate to use strong Nash equi-
librium for implementation in situations where cooperation among agents is
likely. Maskin (1979) showed that monotonicity is a necessary condition for
strong Nash implementability as well. The first full characterization result is
given by Dutta and Sen (1991). They use a similar approach to Moore and
Repullo (1990) and their characterization result also depends on the existence
of a system of sets satisfying a set of properties. Suh (1996a) showed that
one of Dutta and Sen’s conditions was not necessary for implementability and
gave a characterization result with the remaining conditions. He also provided
an algorithm to construct the system of sets used in both results. We give a
new characterization of strong Nash implementable social choice rules via crit-
ical profiles. We modify the definition of critical profiles so that it applies to
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coalitions and we determine the critical alternatives for each coalition at each
profile. We introduce three new conditions for social choice rules; coalitional
monotonicity, preservation of criticals and unique common critical, which to-
gether with Pareto optimality characterize social choice rules that are strong
Nash implementable. We introduce a new mechanism for the sufficiency part
of our result which provides a drastic decrease in the size of the message space
relative to the other mechanisms used in the literature. Finally, we identify a
subset of subgame perfect Nash implementable social choice rules via critical
profiles.
The results obtained in this thesis supports the idea that implementation
theory can be rewritten in terms of monotonicity. Many of the results in the
literature attempt to explain closely related problems with somewhat differ-
ent approaches. Expressing them all in terms of monotonicity in different
environments provides a better understanding of the relation between various
problems and makes it easier to solve those problems that remain open.
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CHAPTER 2
SELF-MONOTONICITY FOR THE
NASH EQUILIBRIUM CONCEPT
Maskin (1977) showed that monotonicity, which is also referred as Maskin-
monotonicity in the literature, is a necessary condition for Nash implementabil-
ity. He also argued that Maskin-monotonicity conjoined with certain condi-
tions, as is exemplified by no veto power or neutrality, is sufficient for Nash
implementability in the presence of at least three agents. Danilov (1992)
strengthened Maskin-monotonicity to “essential monotonicity” so that the
stronger concept is both necessary and sufficient for Nash implementability
on a restricted domain when the number of agents is not less then three.
Thus, the Nash implementability of a social choice rule entirely depends upon
how monotonic it is. In fact, later it was shown by Kaya and Koray (2000)
that implementability strongly depends upon the compatibility between the
monotonicity structures of the social choice rule to be implemented and of the
solution concept according to which implementation is to take place. In par-
ticular, they modified Maskin-monotonicity in a natural way so as to make it
fit the content of game theoretical solution concepts. Given a solution concept
σ, it turned out that every σ-implementable social choice rule was Maskin-
monotonic if and only if σ itself was “Maskin-monotonic” in the modified
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sense. In other words Maskin-monotonicity of σ-implementable social choice
rules was inherited from “Maskin-monotonicity” of σ itself.
The notion of self-monotonicity which is introduced by Koray (2002), is
based on these observations. In Maskin-monotonocity preservation of lower
contour sets for each agent is required for an alternative to continue to be
chosen. In essential monotonicity, only the essential alternatives which are
subsets of the lower contour sets of each agent should be preserved. More
generally, one can introduce different degrees of monotonicity via “a mono-
tonicity function” which assigns to each point in the graph of a social choice
rule a vector each component of which is a subset of the lower contour set
at each point for each agent. The strongest of these monotonicities that is
satisfied by a social choice rule constitutes a self-monotonicity of this social
choice rule. This generalization easily carries over to the inheritance theorem
by Kaya and Koray (2000) in the following way; a self-monotonicity of a social
choice rule implementable in a certain solution concept must be inherited from
a self-monotonicity inherent to the solution concept itself.
In this study we focus on the Nash equilibrium concept. We determine the
unique self-monotonicity of the Nash equilibrium concept and in the light of
the inheritance theorem mentioned above we investigate the implications of
this condition for Nash implementable social choice rules. With a fixed set of
agents, a message space and agents’ preferences over the joint messages, the
Nash equilibrium concept can be viewed as a social choice rule that chooses
at each profile the equilibria of the game that is induced at that profile. Then
a joint strategy which is an equilibrium at some profile continues to be an
equilibrium at some other profile if and only if the joint strategies that can be
achieved by each agent by a unilateral deviation, are less preferred to the cho-
sen joint strategy at the initial profile. A Nash implementable social choice rule
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inherits this self-monotonicity via the mechanisms that implement it. How-
ever, the inherited monotonicity doesn’t need to be a self-monotonicity for the
implemented social choice rule. We define the self-monotonicity of the solution
concept at each joint message. There may be several equilibria at some profile
that is mapped to the same alternative via the implementing mechanism which
implies several monotonicities of different degrees. Moreover, a social choice
rule can be implemented via different mechanisms. One monotonicity for all
Nash implementable social choice rules which is inherited via the Maskin-Vind
type mechanisms is essential monotonicity. However it is not necessarily a
self-monotonicity for a Nash implementable social choice rule.
In the next section we will introduce the main notation and definitions. In
the second section we will define the self-monotonicity of the Nash equilibrium
concept and determine the monotonicities that are inherited by a Nash imple-
mentable social choice rule. In the third section we will establish the relation
between the self-monotonicity of the Nash equilibrium concept and essential
monotonicity.
2.1 Self-Monotonicity
Let N be a nonempty finite set of agents and A be a nonempty finite set
of alternatives. The set of all linear orders on A is denoted by L(A), while
L(A)N stands for the set of all linear order profiles. Given R ∈ L(A)N and
i ∈ N , Ri is the linear order representing agent i’s preferences over A. A social
choice rule (SCR) is a mapping F : L(A)N → 2A which assigns to every linear
order profile R ∈ L(A)N a subset of A. Given an SCR F , its graph is defined
as Gr F = {(a,R) ∈ A× L(A)N | a ∈ F (R)}. For any R ∈ L(A)N , a ∈ A and
i ∈ N , the set Li(a,R) = {b ∈ A | aRib} is the lower contour set of a for i at
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R. An SCR F is Maskin-monotonic if, for any (a,R) ∈ Gr F and R′ ∈ L(A)N ,
one has (a,R′) ∈ Gr F whenever Li(a,R) ⊂ Li(a,R′) for all i ∈ N .
Maskin (1977) showed that any Nash implementable SCR is Maskin-
monotonic and any SCR which is Maskin-monotonic and satisfies no veto
power is Nash implementable in the presence of three or more alternatives.
We define a strengthening of Maskin-monotonicity which allows one to intro-
duce different degrees of monotonicity of SCRs.
Definition 1. Let F : L(A)N → 2A be an SCR. A mapping h : Gr F → (2A)N
is a monotonicity function if {a} ⊂ hi(a,R) ⊂ Li(a,R) for all (a,R) ∈ Gr F
and i ∈ N . Given a monotonicity function h, we say that F is h-monotonic
if, for any (a,R) ∈ Gr F and R′ ∈ L(A)N , one has (a,R′) ∈ Gr F , whenever
hi(a,R) ⊂ Li(a,R′) for all i ∈ N .
h is a stronger monotonicity of F than h′ if hi(a,R) ⊂ h′i(a,R) for all
(a,R) ∈ Gr F and i ∈ N and it is strictly stronger if hi(a,R) ⊂ h′i(a,R) for all
(a,R) ∈ Gr F and i ∈ N , and hj(b, R′) ( h′j(b, R′) for some (b, R′) ∈ Gr F and
j ∈ N . Note that an h-monotonicity of F is equivalent to F being Maskin-
monotonic whenever Li(a,R) ⊂ hi(a,R) ⊂ A for all (a,R) ∈ Gr F and i ∈ N .
We say that F is more monotonic than G if GrG ⊂ Gr F and there exists
h-monotonicities hF , hG of F and G, respectively, such that hF is stronger than
hG.
Example 1. Let F 1 be a dictatorial SCR where agent 1 is the dictator
and F 1 assigns the top ranked alternative of agent 1 at each profile. An h-
monotonicity of F is defined as follows: h1(a,R) = (A, {a}, ..., {a}).
Example 2. Let F IR be the individually rational correspondence defined
as follows: F IR(R) = {a ∈ A | aRia0 for all i ∈ N}. An h-monotonicity of F
is defined as follows: hIR(a,R) = ({a, a0}, ..., {a, a0}) for all a ∈ A \ {a0} and
h(a0, R) = ({a0}, ..., {a0}).
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Essential monotonicity which was introduced by Danilov (1992) is an exam-
ple of an h-monotonicity of Nash implementable SCRs. Essential monotonic-
ity fully characterizes the Nash implementable SCRs when there are three or
more agents and it is stronger than Maskin-monotonicity. We will first give
the original definition of essential monotonicity and then express it as an h-
monotonicity.
Example 3. Let i ∈ N and X ⊂ A. An alternative b ∈ X is essential for
i in set X if b ∈ F (R) for some R ∈ L(A)N such that Li(b, R) ⊂ X. The set
of all essential elements with respect to X ⊂ A is denoted as Ess(F ; i,X). An
SCR F is essentially-monotonic if for any R,R′ ∈ L(A)N and (a,R) ∈ Gr F ,
we have (a,R′) ∈ Gr F whenever Ess(F ; i, Li(a,R)) ⊂ Li(a,R′) for all i ∈ N .
An SCR F is essentially monotonic if and only if it is hess-monotonic where
hess : Gr F → (2A)N is defined as follows:
hessi (a,R) = {b ∈ Li(a,R) | such that b ∈ F (R′′) for some R′′ ∈ L(A)N with
Li(b, R
′′) ⊂ Li(a,R)} for all i ∈ N .
Next we define one of the primary notions of this paper, self-monotonicity.
We refer to the strongest monotonicities of F as its self-monotonicities which
will be made precise in the following definition.
Definition 2. Let F : RN → 2A be an SCR and h : Gr F → (2A)N be a
monotonicity function. We say that h is a self-monotonicity of F if F is h-
monotonic and h is minimal, i.e., there does not exist a monotonicity function
h′ : Gr F → (2A)N such that F is h′-monotonic and h′ is strictly stronger than
h.
A self-monotonicity h of an SCR F specifies a minimal subset of the alter-
native set for each agent i ∈ N at any (a,R) ∈ Gr F such that the preservation
of these sets in the lower contour set for each agent i at outcome a according
to some profile R′ ensures (a,R′) ∈ Gr F .
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Note that h1 and hIR defined in the examples above constitute self-
monotonicities for F 1 and F IR respectively.
Example 4. Let F a be a constant rule where F assigns a ∈ A at each
profile. h1 and hIR are h-monotonicities of F a. However, neither of them are
self-monotonicities of F a. The self-monotonicity of F a is defined as follows:
ha(a,R) = ({a}, ..., {a}). Note that this is the strongest monotonicity of an
SCR.
In the above examples the self-monotonicities of the given SCRs are deter-
mined uniquely. However the self-monotonicity of an SCR does not have to be
unique. In the following example we give the family of the self-monotonicities
of the Pareto correspondence.
Example 5. The Pareto correspondence defined by F PC(R) = {a ∈ A |
@b ∈ A such that bRia for all i ∈ N} has self-monotonicities characterized as
follows: hPC = {h ∈ (2A)N | for all (a,R) ∈ Gr F and i, j ∈ N hi(a,R) ⊂
Li(a,R), hi(a,R) ∩ hj(a,R) = ∅ with i 6= j and
⋃
hi(a,R) = A}.
2.2 Self-Monotonicity of the Nash Equilibrium Concept
When we fix the player set N and the joint strategy space M =
∏
i∈N Mi a
solution concept for normal form games can be viewed as an SCR so that the
notions of h-monotonicity and self-monotonicity will apply to solution concepts
as well. Denoting by R the set of all complete preorders on M , a solution
concept for normal form games with a joint strategy space M , now becomes a
mapping σ : RN → 2M . In this setting the joint strategy space is considered
as the alternative set and the agents’ rankings over the joint strategies as the
preferences over the alternative set. A solution concept assigns a subset of the
joint strategy space to each preference profile in the same way an SCR does.
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The notions of h-monotonicity and self-monotonicity now become applicable to
solution concepts for normal form games. h-monotonicity of a solution concept
will be denoted by H for convenience.
The object of interest of this paper is defining a self-monotonicity of the
Nash equilibrium concept for normal form games and establishing its relation
to implementability. A joint strategy m ∈ M constitutes a Nash equilibrium
at ∈ RN if m i (m′i,m−i) for all m′i ∈ Mi and for all i ∈ N . We will
denote the set of all Nash equilibria at ∈ RN by σNE(). The set (Mi,m−i)
is called agent i’s attainable set at m. Note that a joint strategy m is a
Nash equilibrium at ∈ RN if and only if each agent i’s attainable set at
m is included in the lower contour set for each agent i at m according to .
Based on this observation the unique self-monotonicity of the Nash equilibrium
concept is obtained as follows:
Proposition. Let σNE : RN → 2M be the Nash equilibrium concept. Let
HNE : Gr σNE → (2M)N be defined as follows:
HNEi (m,) = {m′ ∈ Li(m,) | m′ = (m′i,m−i) for some m′i ∈ Mi} for all
i ∈ N .
HNE is the unique self-monotonicity of the Nash equilibrium.
Proof: First we will show that σNE is HNE-monotonic. Let (m,) ∈
Gr σNE and ′∈ RN be such that HNEi (m,) ⊂ Li(m,′) for all i ∈ N .
Then by the definition of HNE we have, for any i ∈ N and for any m′i ∈ Mi,
(mi,m−i)′(m′i,m−i). So, mi is a best response for m−i at ′ and since this
is true for any i ∈ N , m is a Nash equilibrium at ′, i.e., (m,′) ∈ Gr σNE.
Hence σNE is HNE-monotonic.
Next we show that HNE is minimal. Suppose not. Then there exists
H ′ : Gr σNE → (2M)N such that σNE is H ′-monotonic with H ′i(m,) ⊂
HNEi (m,) for all (m,) ∈ Gr σNE and i ∈ N , and H ′j(m′,′) ( HNEj (m′,′)
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for some (m′,′) ∈ Gr σNE and j ∈ N . Let (m,) ∈ Gr σNE be such that
H ′i(m,) ⊂ HNEi (m,) for all i ∈ N , and H ′j(m,) ( HNEj (m,) for some
j ∈ N . Then by definition of HNE, there exists m′ = (m′j,m−j) ∈ M such
that m′ ∈ HNEj (m,) and m′ /∈ H ′j(m,). Define ′ such that ′i = i
for all i ∈ N\{j} and Lj(m,′) = Lj(m,) \ {m′}. By the construction
we have H ′i(m,) ⊂ Li(m,′) for all i ∈ N . But (m,′) /∈ Gr σNE as
(m′j,m−j) ′j (mj,m−j). So σNE is not H ′-monotonic. Hence HNE is minimal.
Finally we will show that HNE is unique. Suppose not. Then there exists
H ′ : Gr σNE → (2M)N such that H ′ is a self-monotonicity for σNE and for
some (m,) ∈ GrσNE and j ∈ N there exists m′ = (m′j,m−j) ∈M such that
m′ ∈ HNEj (m,) and m′ /∈ H ′j(m,). Define ′ as above: ′i = i for all
i ∈ N\{j} and Lj(m,′) = Lj(m,) \ {m′}. Then H ′i(m,) ⊂ Li(m,′)
for all i ∈ N . As σNE is H ′-monotonic, the above inclusions imply that
m ∈ σNE(′). But (m,′) /∈ Gr σNE as (m′j,m−j) ′j (mj,m−j), which
is a contradiction. Hence HNE is the unique self-monotonicity of the Nash
equilibrium concept. 
Next we will examine the relation between the self-monotonicity of the Nash
equilibrium concept and the monotonicity properties of Nash implementable
SCRs. First we introduce some more notation and definitions.
An onto function g : M → A is called an outcome function. A mechanism
consists of a joint strategy space and an outcome function and is denoted by
µ = (M, g). The following notation and definition was introduced by Kaya
and Koray (2000). A complete preorder profile  ∈ RN is called admissible if
one has m∼jm′ ∀j ∈ N , whenever m∼im′ for some i ∈ N , where m,m′ ∈ M .
 is admissible if all the agents have exactly the same indifference classes. A
denotes the set of all admissible profiles. Each admissible profile ∈ A induces
a partition on M consisting of the common indifference classes which will be
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denoted by ρ(). An outcome function g : M → A also induces a partition
{g−1(x) | x ∈ A} on M which will be denoted by p(g). Finally set A (g) =
{∈ A | ρ () = p(g)}.
Let ∈ A (g) and R ∈ L(A)N be given. We say that R is induced by 
via g if for any a, b ∈ A with g(m) = a, g(m′) = b where m,m′ ∈ M , and for
any i ∈ N , we have aRib if and only if mim′ and a = b if and only if m∼im′.
Similarly, we say that  is induced by R via g if and only if for any m, m′ ∈M
and i ∈ N , we have that mim′ if and only if g(m)Rig(m′) and m∼im′ if and
only if g(m) = g(m′). It is clear that R is induced by  via g if and only if 
is induced by R via g. Note that there is a one-to-one correspondence between
linear orders on A and the admissible complete preorder profiles on M with ρ
() = p(g).
Given an SCR F , a solution concept σ and a mechanism µ = (M, g) we
say that F is σ-implementable via µ if for every R ∈ L(A)N , one has F (R) =
g(σ()) where  is the complete preorder profile on M induced by R. F
is said to be σ-implementable if there is some µ = (M, g) via which F is
σ-implementable.
Now we define an h-monotonicity of Nash-implementable SCRs as follows:
Theorem. Let F be an SCR which is Nash-implementable via µ = (M, g).
Let hNE,µ : Gr F → (2A)N be defined as follows:
hNE,µi (a,R) = {b ∈ Li(a,R) | b ∈ g(HNE(m,)) where ∈ A(g) is induced by
R via g and m ∈ σNE()} for all i ∈ N .
hNE,µ is an h-monotonicity for F .
Proof: Let (a,R) ∈ Gr F and R′ ∈ L(A)N such that hNE,µi (a,R) ⊂
Li(a,R
′) for all i ∈ N . Consider ′∈ A (g) that is induced by R′ via g. By the
above inclusions and the definition of hNE,µ, for all (m′i,m−i) ∈ Mi × {m−i}
there exists b ∈ Li(a,R′) such that g(m′i,m−i) = b which implies (m′i,m−i) ∈
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Li(m,′) for all (m′i,m−i) ∈Mi × {m−i}. Now we have (m,) ∈ GrσNE and
Li(m,) ∩ HNE(m,) ⊂ Li(m,′) for all i ∈ N . Then by the proposition
above m ∈ σNE(′) and as F is Nash implementable via µ g(m) = a ∈ F (R′).
Hence F is hNE,µ-monotonic.
The theorem establishes the relation between the unique self-monotonicity
of the Nash equilibrium concept and the monotonicity properties of a Nash
implementable SCR. The h-monotonicities of a Nash implementable SCR are
inherited from the unique self-monotonicity of the Nash equilibrium concept
via the mechanisms that implements the SCR. However the uniqueness is not
inherited due to the following two reasons: One is that an SCR may be Nash
implemented via different mechanisms each of which may impose a different
h-monotonicity on the SCR implemented. We will explore this point in more
detail in the next section. The other reason is that the same mechanism may
also induce several different h-monotonicities of F as there may be several Nash
equilibria leading to the same outcome at a given preference profile. Every
choice of a Nash equilibrium for each outcome in the image of F at a given
profile results in a different h-monotonicity of F . Moore and Repullo (1990)
gave a necessary and sufficient condition for Nash implementability which is
called Condition-µ. Condition-µ requires the existence of systems of sets which
satisfies some specific properties for a given SCR. Each h-monotonicity of an
SCR induced by a mechanism gives us such system of sets.
In the following example we will consider a situation where different equi-
libria lead to different h-monotonicities.
Example 6. Let N = {1, 2, 3} and A = {a, b, c}. Consider all the linear
order profiles, L(A)N , on A. Let M1 = {m,m′,m′′},M2 = {m,m′} and M3 =
{m} be the strategy spaces of each agent and M = ∏i∈N Mi be the joint
strategy space. The outcome function is defined as follows:
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Consider all the admissible profiles on M such that ρ () = p(g). Let
F (R) = σNE() for all ∈ A(g) where R is induced by . Let R be the
following preference profile: aR1bR1c, aR2cR2b and bR3aR3c. The set of
Nash equilibria at  which is induced by R is σNE() = {mmm,m′m′m}
and by definition, F (R) = a. Let m, m′ denote mmm,m′m′m respectively.
The h-monotonicity of F which is induced by m at R maps (a,R) ∈ Gr F
into the following subsets of A: hNE,µ1 (a,R) = {a, b, c}, hNE,µ2 (a,R) = {a, c},
hNE,µ3 (a,R) = {a}. On the other hand, if we consider m′ we obtain the follow-
ing mapping at (a,R) ∈ Gr F : hNE,µ1 (a,R) = {a, b, c}, hNE,µ2 (a,R) = {a, b},
hNE,µ3 (a,R) = {a}.
2.3 Essential Monotonicity as an h-Monotonicity of a Nash Implementable
Social Choice Rule
In this section we will investigate the relation between the essential mono-
tonicity and the h-monotonicities of Nash implementable SCRs. In the previ-
ous section we showed that the h-monotonicities of Nash implementable SCRs
are inherited from the unique self-monotonicity of the Nash solution concept
via the mechanisms that implement it. We also know that essential monotonic-
ity, introduced by Danilov (1992), characterizes the Nash implementable SCRs
on the full domain of linear orders when there are at least three agents. Essen-
tial monotonicity turns out to be an h-monotonicity of Nash implementable
SCRs that is inherited via the Maskin-Vind mechanism. First we will give the
formal definition of essential monotonicity that was mentioned in Example 1.
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Definition 3. Let i ∈ N and X ⊂ A. An alternative b ∈ X is essential for i
in set X if b ∈ F (R) for some R ∈ L(A)N such that Li(b, R) ⊂ X. The set of
all essential elements is denoted as Ess(F ; i,X).
Definition 4. An SCR F is essentially-monotonic if for any R,R′ ∈ L(A)N
and (a,R) ∈ Gr F , we have (a,R′) ∈ Gr F whenever
Ess(F ; i, Li(a,R)) ⊂ Li(a,R′) for all i ∈ N .
The definition of essential monotonicity as an h-monotonicity is explicitly
given by the following monotonicity function:
Let F be an SCR and hess : Gr F → (2A)N be a monotonicity function
which is defined as follows:
hessi (a,R) = {b ∈ Li(a,R) | b ∈ F (R′′) for some R′′ with Li(b, R′′) ⊂ Li(a,R)}
for all i ∈ N .
F is essentially-monotonic if and only if it is hess-monotonic.
The definition above applies to solution concepts for normal form games
with a fixed player set N and joint strategy space M , and in particular to the
Nash equilibrium concept, as discussed in section 2.
Definition 5. Let σ be a solution concept and Hess : Gr σ → (2M)N be a
monotonicity function which is defined as follows:
Hessi (m,) = {m′ ∈ Li(m,) | m′ ∈ σ(′′) for some ′′ with Li(m′,′′) ⊂
Li(m,)} for all i ∈ N .
σ is Hess-monotonic if for any ,′∈ RN and (m,) ∈ Gr σ, we have
(m,′) ∈ Gr σ whenever Hessi (m,) ⊂ Li(m,′) for all i ∈ N .
One natural question that arises then is the relation between essential
monotonicity and the self-monotonicity of the Nash equilibrium concept. It
turns out that the Nash equilibrium concept is Hess-monotonic and the self-
monotonicity of the Nash equilibrium concept is strictly stronger than Hess-
monotonicity. However when we consider the normal form games induced by
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Maskin-Vind type mechanisms, Hess and HNE turn out to be equivalent.
Proposition. The Nash equilibrium concept is Hess-monotonic.
Proof: Let (m,) ∈ GrσNE and m′ = (m′i,m−i) ∈ HNEi (m,) for some
i ∈ N . Consider′ such that L(m′,′j) = M for all j ∈ N\{i} and Li(m′,′) =
Li(m,). Now m′j is a best response to m′−j for all j ∈ N \ {i} at ′. For
i, m′i is a best response to m′−i by definition of HNE. So m′ ∈ σNE(′).
Hence m′ ∈ Hessi (m,i), since m′ ∈ Li(m,) and there exists ′ such that
m′ ∈ σNE(′) with Li(m′,′) ⊂ Li(m,). 
Next we define a mechanism which is referred as a Maskin-Vind type mech-
anism in the literature and widely used in the sufficiency results for Nash
implementation. We define the version of the Maskin-Vind type mechanism
which is used by Danilov (1992) for his sufficiency result.
For each agent i ∈ N the message space is defined as follows:
Mi = {(a,R, n) ∈ L(A)N × A × N | (a,R) ∈ Gr F} where N is the set of
nonnegative integers.
The outcome function g : M → A is defined as follows:
(1) If there exists m ∈ M such that mi = (a,R, n) for all i ∈ N then
g(m) = a.
(2) If there exists i ∈ N such that mj = (a,R, n) for all j 6= i and mi =
(a′, R′, n′) where a′ 6= a, then g(m) = a′ if a′ ∈ Ess(F ; i, Li(a,R)) and g(m) =
a otherwise.
(3) In all other situations let g(m) = ai where i is the agent announcing
the highest integer. Ties are broken in favor of the agent with the smallest
index.
We will denote the Maskin-Vind mechanism by µM−V .
Proposition. Let F be a Nash implementable SCR. hNE,µm−v and hess mono-
tonicities of F are equivalent.
20
Proof: By the above proposition and the theorem from the previous section
it follows that hNE,µm−v ⊂ hess. We need to show that hess ⊂ hNE,µm−v . Let
(a,R) ∈ Gr F and b ∈ hessi (a, r) for some i ∈ N . As F is Nash implementable
there exists m ∈M such that m ∈ σNE(), with g(m) = a where  is induced
byR. We want to show that there existsm′i ∈Mi such that g(m′i,m−i) = b. We
have two cases to consider. First assume condition one of the outcome function
applies, i.e., mi = (a,R, n) for all i ∈ N . Then, as b ∈ hessi (a, r), agent i can
make the outcome b by announcing (b, R′, n′). Second assume condition two or
three applies. Then agent i can make the outcome b by announcing the highest
integer. So, in both cases there exists m′i ∈ Mi such that g(m′i,m−i) = b. As
this is true for any (a,R) ∈ Gr F , i ∈ N and b ∈ hessi (a,R) we conclude that
hess ⊂ hNE,µm−v . 
Note that if we implement the SCR in Example 6 by the Maskin-Vind mech-
anism essential monotonicity is inherited as an h-monotonicity of F . However,
with the finite mechanism defined in the example we obtain a stronger mono-
tonicity than essential monotonicity of F .
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CHAPTER 3
STRONG NASH IMPLEMENTABILITY
VIA CRITICAL PROFILES
While the Nash equilibrium concept considers individual deviations, strong
Nash equilibrium allows for cooperation among agents and incorporates coali-
tional deviations. Roughly, a joint message constitutes a strong Nash equilib-
rium if there is no coalitional deviation which will benefit all the members of
the coalition. It is therefore more appropriate to use strong Nash equilibrium
for implementation in situations where cooperation among agents is likely.
Maskin (1979) showed that monotonicity is a necessary condition for strong
Nash implementability as well. The full characterization results are given by
Dutta and Sen (1991) and Suh (1996a). They both use a similar approach to
Moore and Repullo (1990) and their characterization results also depend on
the existence of a system of sets satisfying a complex set of properties.
In this paper we pursue a rather direct approach, like that of Danilov’s for
Nash implementation, and gives an explicit definition for the system of sets
defined by Dutta and Sen. Our main tool in doing so is the notion of a “critical
profile” which was first introduced in a study by Koray et al. (2001). They
provided a simpler proof of the well known Mu¨ller-Satterthwaite theorem via
critical profiles.
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In another study Dog˘an and Koray (2007) explored more social choice the-
oretic implication of the notion and also provided a new characterization for
two-person Nash implementable social choice rules. Roughly, a critical profile
for an alternative, a, is a preference profile at which a is chosen and which
has the following property: at any preference profile that is obtained from the
critical profile by a reversal of an ordering between a and any alternative that
is less preferred than a from the view point of some individual, a is not chosen
by the social choice rule. We modify the general definition of a critical profile
for coalitions and we obtain the set of critical profiles for each coalition from
a given profile. Then we determine the critical alternatives for each coalition
by applying a test to the alternatives that are less preferred than the alter-
native that is chosen by the individuals in this coalition. We introduce three
new conditions for social choice rules; coalitional monotonicity, preservation of
criticals and unique common critical, which together with Pareto optimality
characterize social choice rules that are strong Nash implementable.
The mechanism that we use for the characterization result is simple. Each
individual announces an alternative and a critical profile for that alternative.
At each joint message the outcome is the “unique common critical” that is
defined by the unique common critical condition. Here, it should be noted
that the size of the message space depends on the size of the set of critical
profiles. So once the critical profiles are determined for a social choice rule
we not only conclude whether it is implementable or not but also implement
it very easily. The mechanism that was introduced by Dutta and Sen, and
used for the existing characterization results is more complicated. There each
individual announces a profile, an alternative that is chosen at this profile, a
positive integer, and raises a flag or not. Then they define a suitable outcome
function for the implementation to take place.
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In the next section we introduce the general environment and basic def-
initions. In the third section, we define critical profiles and introduce new
conditions for social choice rules regarding their critical profiles. Then we
show that the conditions are both necessary and sufficient for strong Nash
implementable social choice rules.
3.1 Notation and Definitions
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a nonempty finite set of agents and A be a nonempty
finite set of alternatives. A preference profile is an n-tuple, R = (R1, . . . , Rn)
where each Ri is a linear order
1 on A which represents agent i’s preferences
on A. The set of all linear order profiles on A is denoted by L(A)N . A social
choice rule (SCR) is a mapping F : L(A)N → 2A which assigns to every linear
order profile R ∈ L(A)N a subset of A.2 The graph of an SCR F , is defined
as Gr F = {(a,R) ∈ A× L(A)N | a ∈ F (R)}. For any R ∈ L(A)N , a ∈ A and
i ∈ N , the set L(i, a, R) = {b ∈ A | aRib} is the lower contour set of a for i at
R. Let N denote the set of all nonempty subsets of N . The collective lower
contour set of T ∈ N is defined as the union of the lower contour sets of each
agent in T : L(T, a,R) =
⋃
i∈T
L(i, a, R). An SCR F is Pareto optimal if for all
(a,R) ∈ GrF , L(N, a,R) = A.
A joint strategy space is the product space of nonempty strategy sets of
every agent and is denoted by M =
∏
i∈N
Mi. An onto function g : M → A is
called an outcome function. A mechanism consists of a joint strategy space
and an outcome function and is denoted by µ = (M, g). Note that µ defines
1A linear order is a complete, transitive, reflexive, antisymmetric binary relation.
2We will assume that F is onto. In general, all the results continue to hold if we restrict
F to the image of F .
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a normal form game at each R ∈ L(A)N via the outcome function g. Given
T ∈ N , a joint strategy for T is mT = (mi)i∈T ∈MT =
∏
i∈T
Mi.
Given a preference profile R ∈ L(A)N and a mechanism µ = (M, g), a
joint strategy m ∈ M constitutes a strong Nash equilibrium of the game
(µ,R), if for all T ∈ N and m′T ∈ MT there exists i ∈ T such that
g(m)Rig(m
′
T ,mN\T ). The set of all strong Nash equilibria of the game (µ,R) is
denoted by SN(µ,R). A mechanism µ implements an SCRF in strong Nash
equilibrium if g(SN(µ,R)) = F (R) for all R ∈ L(A)N . F is said to be strong
Nash implementable if there is some mechanism µ that implements F.
3.2 Critical Profiles and the Characterization Result
In this section we will first define critical profiles and then introduce three
new conditions for SCRs via critical profiles. These conditions, namely, coali-
tional monotonicity, condition of preservation of criticals, and condition of
unique common critical together with Pareto optimality turn out to be both
necessary and sufficient conditions for strong Nash implementability.
Definition 1. Given a ∈ A, T ∈ N , R,R′ ∈ L(A)N , R′ is said to be a (T, a)-
refinement of R if L(T, a,R′) ⊂ L(T, a,R) and for all i ∈ N\T , L(i, a, R′) =
L(i, a, R).3 R′ is a strict (T,a)-refinement of R if the inclusion for T is strict.
For an illustration consider an environment withN = {1, 2, 3}, A = {a, b, c}
and let R,R′ be defined as follows:
R1 R2 R3 R
′
1 R
′
2 R
′
3
b b a b c a
a a b a a b
c c c c b c
Now, R′ is a (23, a), (12, b), (N, a), (N, b)-refinement and a strict
(2, b), (23, b)-refinement of R. R is a (23, a), (12, b), (N, a), (N, b)-refinement
3We denote set inclusion and strict set inclusion by ⊂ and ( respectively.
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and a strict (12, a), (2, c), (12, c), (23, c), (N, c)-refinement of R′. Note that the
lower contour set of an alternative a for each agent i ∈ T at a (T, a)-refinement
does not need to be a subset of the lower contour set of a for each i ∈ T at
the original profile: L(2, a, R) 6⊂ L(2, a, R′) but L(12, a, R) ⊂ L(12, a, R′) and
as L(3, a, R) = L(3, a, R′), R is a strict (12, a)-refinement of R′.
Let F : L(A)N → 2A be an SCR which will be kept fixed in the definitions
below.
Definition 2. Given (a,R) ∈ GrF and T ∈ N , R is said to be a (T, a)-
critical profile relative to F if for any strict (T, a)-refinement R′ of R, one has
a 6∈ F (R′).
Notation: C(T, a) = the set of all (T, a)-critical profiles relative to F .
For example, let F be the SCR that chooses all the Pareto optimal al-
ternatives at each profile: F PO(R) = {a ∈ A|L(N, a,R) = A}. Then
given (a,R) ∈ Gr F, T ∈ N , R is a (T, a)-critical profile if L(T, a,R)\{a} =
A\L(N\T, a,R). As a second example consider the SCR where agent 1 is the
dictator: FD1(R) = {a ∈ A|L(1, a, R) = A}. Let (a,R) ∈ Gr F and T ∈ N .
We have two cases: R is a (T, a)-critical profile if (1 ∈ T and L(T, a,R) = A)
or (1 6∈ T and L(T, a,R) = {a}).
Definition 3. Given (a,R) ∈ GrF , T ∈ N and R′ ∈ L(A)N , we say that R′
is a (T, a,R)-critical profile if R′ is a (T, a)-critical (T, a)-refinement of R.
Notation: C(T, a,R) = the set of all (T, a,R)-critical profiles.
In Definition (3) we are considering the set of critical profiles obtained from
a given profile. Obviously, C(T, a,R) ⊂ C(T, a) for all (a,R) ∈ Gr F .
Definition 4. Given (a,R) ∈ GrF , T ∈ N , R′ ∈ C(T, a,R), b ∈ L(T, a,R′)
and R′′ ∈ L(A)N such that L(i, a, R′′) = L(i, a, R′)\{b} for all i ∈ T and
L(i, a, R′′) = L(i, a, R′) ∪ {b} for all i ∈ N\T , b is a (T, a,R)-critical element
relative to R′ if b 6∈ F (R′′).
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Notation: Cr(T, a,R,R′) = the set of all (T, a,R)-critical profiles relative to
R′.
Definition 5. Given (a,R) ∈ GrF , T ∈ N , the set Cr(T, a,R) of all (T, a,R)-
critical elements is defined as Cr(T, a,R) =
⋃
R′∈C(T,a,R)
Cr(T, a,R,R′).
Let N = {1, 2, 3}, A = {a, b, c} and R be such that aR1bR1c, bR2aR2c, and
cR3aR3b. Consider F
PO defined above. Then a ∈ F PO(R). By the above ar-
gument, R′ ∈ C(12, a, R) if L(12, a, R′)\{a} = A\L(3, a, R), i.e., L(12, a, R′) =
{a, c}. Now, let R′′ ∈ L(A)N be such that L(i, a, R′′) = L(i, a, R′)\{c} = {a}
for all i ∈ 1, 2 and L(3, a, R′′) = L(3, a, R′)∪{c} = A for some R′ ∈ C(12, a, R).
Then c ∈ F (R′′) and as this is true for all R′ ∈ C(12, a, R), c 6∈ Cr(12, a, R),
and Cr(12, a, R) = {a}. Similarly, for all T ∈ N\N Cr(T, a,R) = {a} and
Cr(N, a,R) = A.
Remark: If T ′ ⊂ T then Cr(T ′, a, R) ⊂ Cr(T, a,R).
Definition 6. F is coalitionally monotonic if, for all (a,R) ∈ GrF,R′ ∈
L(A)N , one has for all T ∈ N : Cr(T, a,R) ⊂ L(T, a,R′) implies a ∈ F (R′).
The monotonicity condition introduced by Maskin (1977) is well-known in
the literature: F is Msakin-monotonic if for all (a,R) ∈ Gr F , R′ ∈ L(A)N
one has a ∈ F (R′) whenever L(i, a, R) ⊂ L(i, a, R′) for all i ∈ N . Maskin
showed that monotonicity is a necessary condition for both Nash and strong
implementability. Coalitional monotonicity which is both a necessary and
sufficient condition for strong Nash implementability is stronger than Maskin-
monotonicity:
Proposition. If F is coalitionally monotonic then it is Masking monotonic.
Proof: Suppose not. Then there exists (a,R) ∈ Gr F and R′ ∈ L(A)N
such that L(i, a, R) ⊂ L(i, a, R′) for all i ∈ N , but a 6∈ F (R′). If Cr(T, a,R) ⊂
L(T, a,R′) for all T ∈ 2N\{∅} then by coalitional monotonicity one has a ∈
F (R′). So there exists T ∈ 2N\{∅} such that Cr(T, a,R) 6⊂ L(T, a,R′). Let
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x ∈ Cr(T, a,R) and x 6∈ L(T, a,R′). Then there exists R¯ ∈ C(T, a,R) such
that x ∈ L(T, a, R¯) ⊂ L(T, a,R) = ⋃
i∈T
L(i, a, R) ⊂ ⋃
i∈T
L(i, a, R′) = L(T, a,R′),
which is a contradiction. 
The converse is not true:
Example 1. Let A = {a, b, c, d} and N = {1, 2, 3}. F = L(A)N → 2A is
defined as follows:
F (R) =
{
x, if x ∈ {b, c, d} and x is top-ranked by at least one agent.
a, if aR1c and aR2d and [aR1b or aR2c].
We will first show that F is not coalitionally monotonic. Let R be a
preference profile such that aR1bR1c and aR2cR2d. Then a ∈ F (R) and
Cr(1, a, R) = {a, c}, Cr(2, a, R) = {a, d} and Cr(12, a, R) = {a, b, c, d}. Now
consider a profile R′ such that aR′1c, aR
′
2dR
′
2b. Note that Cr(T, a,R) ⊂
L(T, a,R′) for all T ∈ 2N\{∅} but a 6∈ F (R′). So F is not coalitionally
monotonic.
Next we will show that F is Maskin monotonic. Let x ∈ {b, c, d} and
x ∈ F (R). Then x is top-ranked by at least one agent at R. If L(i, x, R) ⊂
L(i, x, R′) for all i ∈ N , then x will continue to be top-ranked by at least one
agent at R′, hence x ∈ F (R′). Let a ∈ F (R). Then aR1c, aR2d, and aR1b or
aR2c. If the lower contour sets of a for each agent are preserved at R
′, then
a ∈ F (R′). So F is Maskin monotonic.
Next we will introduce two more conditions via critical profiles and critical
elements. The first condition requires the existence of an (N, a∗)-critical profile,
R∗, for each (a,R) ∈ Gr F such that anything critical at R∗ for a coalition T ,
will be an (S, a,R)-critical element where S is a superset of T . The second
condition requires the existence of a unique critical element and a critical
profile for any sequence of coalitions and points in the Gr F that satisfies some
specific conditions. This second condition implies a crucial simplification in
the mechanism that we use for the characterization result.
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Definition 7. F satisfies the condition of preservation of criticals if for each
(a,R) ∈ Gr F , T ∈ N , and a∗ ∈ Cr(T, a,R) there exists R∗ ∈ C(N, a∗) such
that Cr(S, a∗, R∗) ⊂ Cr(T ∪ S, a,R) for all S ∈ N .
Definition 8. {(T i, ai, Ri)}ki=1 is an adequate sequence in N ×Gr F if for all
i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k} with i 6= j T i ∪ T j = N , (ai, Ri) 6= (aj, Rj) and
k⋂
i=1
T i = ∅.
Definition 9. a∗ ∈ A is a common critical for an adequate sequence
{(T i, ai, Ri)}ki=1 if a∗ ∈
k⋂
i=1
Cr(T i, ai, Ri).
Definition 10. F satisfies the condition of unique common critical if for each
adequate sequence {(T i, ai, Ri)}ki=1 there exists a common critical a∗ ∈ A and
a profile R∗ ∈ C(N, a∗) such that Cr(S, a∗, R∗) ⊂
k⋂
i=1
Cr(T i ∪ S, ai, Ri) for all
S ∈ N .
Theorem. An SCRF is strong Nash implementable if and only if it is Pareto
optimal, coalitionally monotonic, satisfies the condition of preservation of crit-
icals and the condition of unique common critical.
Proof:
Sufficiency:
The following mechanism µ = (M, g) will be used to establish the result:
The strategy space of each agent i ∈ N is,
Mi = {(ai, Ri) ∈ Gr F |Ri ∈ C(N, ai)}
Define the outcome function g : M → A for any m ∈M as follows:
1. If (ai, Ri) = (a,R) for all i ∈ N , then g(m) = a.
2. Otherwise, g(m) = a∗ where a∗ is the unique common critical for the
adequate sequence {(N\T i, ai, Ri)}ki=1 where each T i consists of agents
that announces the same message (ai, Ri) and (ai, Ri) 6= (aj, Rj) for all
i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k} with i 6= j.
Note that {T i}ki=1 partitions N . So, N\T i ∪ N\T j = N for all i, j ∈
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{1, . . . , k} and
k⋂
i=1
N\T i = ∅ which guarantee the existence of a∗ in (2) by the
unique common critical condition.
Step 1: F (R) ⊆ g(SN(µ,R)) for all R ∈ L(A)N .
Let a∗ ∈ F (R∗). Consider a strategy m∗ ∈ M such that m∗i = (a∗, R) for
all i ∈ N where R ∈ C(N, a∗, R∗) ⊂ C(N, a∗) with L(T, a∗, R) ⊂ L(T, a∗, R∗)
for all T ∈ N . We want to show that m∗ ∈ SN(µ,R∗) and g(m∗) = a∗.
By (1) g(m∗) = a∗. Next, consider a deviation m′T by T ∈ N from m∗.
We need to show that g(m′T ,m
∗
N\T ) ∈ L(T, a∗, R∗). If T = N then by
Pareto optimality g(m′N) ∈ L(N, a∗, R∗) = A. Suppose T 6= N . Now we
have a partition T 1, ..., T k of N where all the agents in each T i announces
the same strategy. Let T k be the coalition where mi = (a
∗, R) for all
i ∈ T k. By (2) g(m′T ,m∗N\T ) = a′ where a′ is the unique common crit-
ical for the adequate sequence {(N\T i, ai, Ri)}ki=1 which implies by defini-
tion that a′ ∈
k⋂
i=1
Cr(N\T i, ai, Ri) and in particular, a′ ∈ Cr(N\T k, a∗, R).
Note that N\T k ⊂ T . So a′ = g(m′T ,m∗N\T ) ∈ Cr(T, a∗, R). We also
have R ∈ C(N, a∗, R∗) and L(T, a∗, R) ⊂ L(T, a∗, R∗) for all T ∈ N which
implies L(i, a∗, R) ⊂ L(i, a∗, R∗) for all i ∈ N and there is no strict N-
refinement R′ of R such that a∗ ∈ F (R′). But that means R ∈ C(T, a∗, R∗)
and Cr(T, a∗, R) ⊂ L(T, a∗, R). As L(T, a∗, R) ⊂ L(T, a∗, R∗) we have
a′ = g(m′T , s
∗
N\T ) ∈ L(T, a∗, R∗) as required.
Step 2: g(SN(µ,R)) ⊂ F (R) for all R ∈ L(A)N .
Let a∗ ∈ g(SN(µ,R∗)). We will show that a∗ ∈ F (R∗). There are two cases
to consider. First, assume that (1) applies and m∗ ∈ SN(µ,R∗) is such that
(ai, Ri) = (a∗, R) for all i ∈ N . As a∗ ∈ F (R), if we show that Cr(T, a∗, R) ⊂
L(T, a∗, R∗) holds for all T ∈ N then by coalitional monotonicity we conclude
that a∗ ∈ F (R∗). Let a′ ∈ Cr(T, a∗, R) for some T ∈ N . By the condition
of preservation of criticals there exists R′ ∈ C(N, a′) such that Cr(S, a′, R′) ⊂
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Cr(T∪S, a∗, R) for all S ∈ N . Now suppose T deviates and announces (a′, R′).
We want to show that g(m′T ,m
∗
N\T ) = a
′, i.e., a′ is the unique common critical
for the collection {(T, a∗, R), (N\T, a′, R′)}. Obviously a′ ∈ Cr(T, a∗, R) ∩
Cr(N\T, a′, R′). Let a¯ ∈ Cr(S ′, a′, R′) for some S ′ ∈ N . Then by our choice
of R′, we have a¯ ∈ Cr(T ∪ S ′, a∗, R) ∩ Cr((N\T ) ∪ S ′, a′, R′). As this is
true for all a¯ ∈ Cr(S ′, a′, R′) and for all S ′ ∈ N , then g(m′T ,m∗N\T ) = a′ as
required. Since m∗ ∈ SN(µ,R∗) we have a′ ∈ L(T, a∗, R∗). As this is true for
all a′ ∈ Cr(T, a∗, R) and for all T ⊂ N by coalitional monotonicity a∗ ∈ F (R∗).
Assume (2) applies and g(m) = a∗ where a∗ is the unique common
critical for the collection {(N\T i, ai, Ri)}ki=1 with R ∈ C(N, a∗), i.e., a∗ ∈
k⋂
i=1
Cr(N\T i, ai, Ri) and Cr(T, a∗, R) ⊂
k⋂
i=1
Cr((N\T i) ∪ T, ai, Ri) for all
T ∈ N . Let a′ ∈ Cr(S, a∗, R) for some S ∈ N . If we show that
a′ can be obtained by a deviation of S then we have a′ ∈ L(S, a∗, R∗)
as m∗ ∈ SN(µ,R∗). By the condition of preservation of criticals there
exists R′ ∈ C(N, a′) such that Cr(S ′, a′, R′) ⊂ Cr(S ∪ S ′, a∗, R′) for all
S ′ ∈ N . Suppose S deviates and announces (a′, R′). We want to show
that g(m′S,m
∗
N\S) = a
′. Let T¯ i’s be the new coalitions which are formed
after the deviation of S such that everybody in each T¯ i announces the same
message. Note that (N\T i) ∪ S ⊂ (N\T¯ i) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Then we
have Cr((N\T i) ∪ S, ai, Ri) ⊂ Cr(N\T¯ i, ai, Ri) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, which
implies a′ ∈ Cr(N\S, a′, R′) ∩
k⋂
i=1
Cr(N\T¯ i, ai, Ri). Next we will show that
Cr(S ′, a′, R′) ⊂ Cr((N\S) ∪ S ′, a′, R′) ∩
k⋂
i=1
Cr((N\T i) ∪ S ′, ai, Ri) for all
S ′ ∈ N . Let a¯ ∈ Cr(S¯, a′, R′) for some S¯ ∈ N . Then by our choice of R′
we have a¯ ∈ Cr(S ∪ S¯, a∗, R) and as Cr(T, a∗, R) ⊂
k⋂
i=1
Cr((N\T i) ∪ T, ai, Ri)
for all T ∈ N , a¯ ∈
k⋂
i=1
Cr((N\T i) ∪ S ∪ S¯, ai, Ri) ⊂
k⋂
i=1
Cr((N\T¯ i) ∪ S¯, ai, Ri).
As this is true for all a¯ ∈ Cr(S¯, a′, R′) and for all S¯ ∈ N , then a′ is the unique
common critical for the collection {(N\T i, ai, Ri)}ki=1 ∪ {(N\S, a′, R′)} with
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R′ ∈ C(N, a′) and g(m′S,m∗N\S) = a′ as required. Then again by coalitional
monotonicity we conclude that a∗ ∈ F (R∗).
Necessity:
The following lemma will be used for the necessity of the conditions.
Lemma. Let (a,R) ∈ Gr F and T ∈ N . Then Cr(T, a,R) =⋃
m∈ma,R
⋃
m′T∈MT
g(m′T ,mN\T ) where ma,R = {m ∈ M : m ∈ SNE(µ,R), with
g(m) = a}.
Proof:
Cr(T, a,R) ⊂ ⋃
m∈ma,R
⋃
m′T∈MT
g(m′T ,mN\T )
Let a¯ ∈ Cr(T, a,R). Suppose a¯ 6∈ ⋃
m∈ma,R
⋃
m′T∈MT
g(m′T ,mN\T ), i.e., there
does not exist m′T ∈ MT such that g(m′T ,mN\T ) = a¯ for some m ∈ ma,R. a¯ ∈
Cr(T, a,R) implies that there exists R′ ∈ C(T, a,R) such that a¯ ∈ L(T, a,R′)
and at R′′ ∈ L(A)N with L(i, a, R′′) = L(i, a, R′)\{a¯} for all i ∈ T and
L(i, a, R′′) = L(i, a, R′) ∪ {a¯} for all i ∈ N\T , a¯ 6∈ F (R′′). Let m ∈ SN(µ,R′)
with g(m) = a and m′ = (m′S,mN\S) where T ⊂ S and g(m′) = a¯. We have
two cases to consider: First, assume that a¯ ∈ L(S\T, a,R′). Then if a¯ is in
the upper contour set of a for all i ∈ T , all else left the same, m continues to
constitute a strong Nash equilibrium according to the new profile R¯ which is a
strict T-refinement of R′. But then a¯ ∈ F (R¯) which contradicts with R′ being
a (T, a,R)-critical profile. Second, assume that a¯ 6∈ L(S\T, a,R′). Then we
again have a contradiction as a¯ ∈ F (R′′) where R′′ is as defined above.
Cr(T, a,R) ⊃ ⋃
m∈ma,R
⋃
m′T∈MT
g(m′T ,mN\T )
Let m ∈ ma,R and m′ = (m′T ,mN\T ) with g(m′) = a¯. Let R′ ∈ C(T, a,R)
be such that m ∈ ma,R′ , i.e., m ∈ SNE(µ,R′). Then a¯ ∈ L(T, a,R′) and at
R′′ ∈ L(A)N with L(i, a, R′′) = L(i, a, R′)\{a¯} for all i ∈ T and L(i, a, R′′) =
L(i, a, R′) ∪ {a¯} for all i ∈ N\T , a¯ 6∈ F (R′′) by definition of strong Nash
equilibrium. So a¯ ∈ Cr(T, a,R).
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Pareto optimality directly follows from the definition of strong Nash equi-
librium.
Coalitional Monotonicity:
Let (a,R) ∈ GrF,R′ ∈ L(A)N , and Cr(T, a,R) ⊂ L(T, a,R′) for all T ∈
N . Let m ∈ ma,R. By the lemma for all T ∈ N we have g(m′T ,mN\T ) ∈
Cr(T, a,R) ⊂ L(T, a,R′). Then by the definition of strong Nash equilibrium
we have m ∈ SNE(µ,R′) and g(m) = a ∈ F (R′).
Condition of Transitive Criticals:
Suppose F is strong Nash implementable. Let (a,R) ∈ Gr F , ∅ 6= T ⊂
N and a∗ ∈ Cr(T, a,R). As F is strong Nash implementable there exists
m ∈ M such that g(m) = a and m is a strong Nash equilibrium at R. By
the above lemma there exists m∗ ∈ M such that m∗ = (m∗T ,mN , T ) and
g(m∗) = a∗. Let R∗ ∈ C(N, a∗) be the preference profile at which m∗ is a
strong Nash equilibrium. Let a′ ∈ Cr(S, a∗, R∗) and consider the following
joint strategy: m′ = (m∗T\S,m
′
S\T ,m
′′
T∩S,mN\(T∪S)). The by the above lemma
a′ ∈ Cr(T ∪ S, a,R).
Condition of Unique Common Critical:
Suppose F is strong Nash implementable. Let a∗ ∈ A be a common critical
for the collection {(T i, ai, Ri)}ki=1 i.e., a∗ ∈
k⋃
i=1
Cr(T ,ai, Ri). As F is strong
Nash implementable for each (ai, Ri) there exists mi ∈M such that g(mi) = ai
and mi is a strong Nash equilibrium at Ri. Let m∗ be the following joint
strategy with g(m∗) = a∗: m∗ = (m1N\T 1 , . . . ,m
k
N\Tk). Note that N\T i ∩
N\T j) = N\(T i ∪ T j) = ∅ as T i ∪ T j = N for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Moreover
k⋃
i=1
(N\T i) = N\
k⋂
i=1
T i = N as
k⋂
i=1
T i = ∅. So by the above lemma m∗ is
the unique joint strategy such that g(m∗) = a∗ ∈
k⋂
i=1
Cr(T i, ai, Ri). Now
let R∗ ∈ C(N, a∗) be the preference profile at which m∗ is a strong Nash
equilibrium. Let a′ ∈ Cr(S, a∗, R∗). Then by the above lemma there exists
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m′ ∈M such that g(m′) = a′ and m′ = (m′S,m∗N\S) = (m′S,m1N\T¯ 1 , . . . ,mkN\T¯k)
where N\T¯ i = N\(T i ∪ S). So again by the lemma a′ ∈
k⋂
i=1
Cr(T i ∪ S, ai, Ri).
Next suppose there is a collection of joint messages such that m∗i =
(m′T i ,m
i
N\T i) for some m
′
T i ∈ MT i , with g(m∗i) = a∗ for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
Then a∗ is a common critical for the collection {(T i, ai, Ri)}ki=1.
Now suppose there exists R∗ ∈ C(N, a∗) such that for all ∅ 6= S ⊂ N ,
Cr(S, a∗, R∗) ⊂
k⋂
i=1
Cr(T i ∪ S, ai, Ri), where m∗i is the equilibrium at R∗
for some i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Without loss of generality assume i = 1, i.e.,
m∗1 = (m1T 1 ,m
1
N\T 1). Consider the strategy m¯
∗1 = (m2T 2 ,m
∗1
N\T 2). By
the lemma g(m¯∗1) ∈ Cr(T 2, a∗, R∗). Then by our assumption g(m¯∗1) ∈
k⋂
i=1
Cr(T i∪T 2, ai, Ri), in particular, g(m¯∗1) ∈ Cr(T 2, a2, R2). But again by the
lemma g(m¯∗1) = g(m2T 2 ,m
∗1
N\T 2) ∈ Cr(N\T 2, a2, R2), which is a contradiction.
So, there exists a unique m∗ ∈M,m∗ = (m1N\T 1 , . . . ,mkN\Tk) with g(m∗) =
a∗ and a unique R∗ ∈ C(N, a∗) where m∗ is the equilibrium at R∗, such that
for all ∅ 6= S ⊂ N , Cr(S, a∗, R∗) ⊂
k⋂
i=1
Cr(T i ∪ S, ai, Ri).
We now give some examples of social choice rules and examine whether
they are strong Nash implementable.
Example 2. Let N = {1, . . . , n}, A be a finite set of alternatives,
and F PO = {a ∈ A|L(N, a,R) = A}. F PO is coalitionally monotonic and
satisfies preservation of criticals, but F PO does not satisfy the condition of
unique common critical. Hence, F PO is not strong Nash implementable: First
note that for any (a,R) ∈ Gr F and T ∈ N , R′ ∈ C(T, a,R) if and only
if L(T, a,R′)\{a} = A\L(N\T, a,R′). Moreover Cr(T, a,R) = {a} for all
T ∈ N\{N} and Cr(N, a,R) = A.
Coalitional monotonicity: Let (a,R) ∈ Gr F,R′ ∈ L(A)N and
Cr(T, a,R) ⊂ L(T, a,R′) for all T ∈ N . As Cr(N, a,R) = A ⊂ L(N, a,R′) we
have a ∈ F (R′) as required.
34
Preservation of criticals: Let (a,R) ∈ Gr F and a∗ ∈ Cr(T, a,R) for some
T ∈ N . There are two possibilities: First, T 6= N . Then a∗ = a and for all
R∗ ∈ C(N, a) and S ∈ N we have Cr(S, a,R∗) ⊂ Cr(T ∪ S, a,R). Second,
T = N . Let a∗ ∈ Cr(N, a,R) = A. Then for all R∗ ∈ C(N, a∗) and s ∈ N we
have Cr(S, a∗, R∗) ⊂ Cr(N ∪ S, a,R) = A.
Unique common critical: Let {(T i, ai, Ri)}ki=1 be an adequate sequence.
By definition (ai, Ri) 6= (aj, Rj) for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k} with i 6= j. Then
k⋂
i=1
Cr(T i, ai, Ri) =
k⋂
i=1
{ai} = ∅. So there does not exist a common critical
for {(T i, ai, Ri)}ki=1. Hence F PO does not satisfy the condition of the unique
common critical. 
Example 3. Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a finite set of agents, A be a finite
set of alternatives and F IR(R) = {a ∈ A|aRib for all i ∈ n, with b ∈ A}.
Note that for any (a,R) ∈ Gr F and T ∈ N , R′ ∈ C(T, a,R) if and only if
L(T, a,R′) = {a, b} and Cr(T, a,R) = {a, b} for all T ∈ N . Obviously, F IR is
coalitionally monotonic and satisfies preservation of criticals. F IR also satisfies
the condition of unique common critical where b is the unique common critical
for any adequate sequence with Rb ∈ C(N, b) such that b is bottom ranked by
all the agents at Rb. However, F IR is not Pareto optimal and hence not strong
Nash implementable.
Example 4. Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a finite set of agents, A be a finite
set of alternatives and F IR−PO(R) = {a ∈ A|aRib for all i ∈ n, with b ∈
A and L(N, a,R) = A}. F IR−PO is Pareto optimal, coalitionally monotonic
and satisfies the conditions of the preservation of criticals and unique common
critical, hence, F IR−PO is strong Nash implementable.
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3.3 More Sufficient Conditions
In this section we define modifications of the condition of preservation of
criticals and condition of unique common critical which are easier to check
whether an SCR satisfies them. Together with Pareto optimality and coali-
tional monotonicity these conditions are sufficient for strong Nash imple-
mentability.
Definition 11. F satisfies the condition of preservation of criticals, if for
all R ∈ C(N, a), T ∈ N , a∗ ∈ Cr(T, a,R), and R∗ ∈ C(N, a∗) one has
Cr(S, a∗, R∗) ⊂ Cr(T, a,R) for all S ⊂ T .
Definition 12. F satisfies the condition of common criticals if there is a
common critical for any adequate sequence.
Theorem. An SCRF is strong Nash implementable if it is Pareto optimal,
coalitionally monotonic, satisfies the condition of common criticals, and the
condition of preservation of criticals.
Proof:
The following mechanism µ = (M, g) will be used to establish the result:
The strategy space of each agent i ∈ N is,
Mi = {(ai, Ri, di, ni)|Ri ∈ C(N, ai), di ∈ {0, 1}, ni ∈ N}
where N denotes the set of positive integers.
Let w(mT ) be the integer game winner which is defined as, w(mT ) = l ∈ T ,
if ml ≥ mi,∀i ∈ T\{l} and if ml = mi for some i ∈ T\{l}, then l < i.
Define the outcome function g : M → A for any m ∈M as follows:
1. If there exists (a,R, 0) ∈ A × L(A)N × {0, 1} such that (ai, Ri, di) =
(a,R, 0) for all i ∈ N , then g(m) = a.
2. If there exists T 1, . . . , T r, T r+1, . . . , T k ⊂ N such that ⋃
i∈{1,...,k}
T i =
N with T i 6= ∅ for some i ∈ {1, . . . r} and for each T i ∈
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{T 1, . . . , T r}, (aj, Rj, dj) = (ai, Ri, 0) for all j ∈ T i, and for each T i ∈
{T r+1, . . . , T k}, (aj, Rj, dj) = (ai, Ri, 1) for all j ∈ T i, then g(m) = a∗
where a∗ ∈
r⋂
i
Cr(N\T i, ai, Ri) and a¯Rlla for all a ∈
r⋂
i
Cr(N\T i, ai, Ri)
with l = w(mT ) where T = T
r+1 ∪ . . . ∪ T k.
3. If d = 1 for all i ∈ N then g(m) = al with l = w(mN).
The nonemptiness of the set
k⋂
i
Cr(N\T i, ai, Ri) in is guaranteed by the
condition of common criticals. In (2) the outcome is determined by the
dictatorship of the agent who announces the highest integer, on the set
k⋂
i
Cr(N\T i, ai, Ri).
Step 1 F (R) ⊆ g(SN(µ,R)) for all R ∈ L(A)N .
Let a∗ ∈ F (R∗). Consider a strategy m∗ ∈ M such that m∗i = (a∗, R, 0, 0)
for all i ∈ N where R ∈ C(N, a∗, R∗) ⊂ C(N, a∗) with L(T, a∗, R) ⊂
L(T, a∗, R∗) for all T ⊂ 2N\{∅}. We want to show that m∗ ∈ SN(µ,R∗)
and g(m∗) = a∗. By (1) g(m∗) = a∗. Next, consider a deviation m′T by T ⊂ N
from m∗. We need to show that g(m′T ,m
∗
N\T ) ∈ L(T, a∗, R∗). If T = N then
by Pareto optimality g(m′N) ∈ L(N, a∗, R∗) = A. Suppose T 6= N . Now
we have a partition T 1, ..., T k of N where all the agents in each partition an-
nounces the same strategy. Let T k be the coalition where mi = (a
∗, R, 0, 0)
for all i ∈ T k. By (2) we have g(m′T ,m∗N\T ) ∈ Cr(N\T k, a∗, R). Note that
N\T k ⊂ T . So g(m′T ,m∗N\T ) ∈ Cr(T, a∗, R). We also have R ∈ C(N, a∗, R∗)
and L(T, a∗, R) ⊂ L(T, a∗, R∗) for all T ⊂ 2N\{∅} which implies L(i, a∗, R) ⊂
L(i, a∗, R∗) for all i ∈ N and there is no strict N-refinement R′ of R such that
a∗ ∈ F (R′). But that means R ∈ C(T, a∗, R∗) and Cr(T, a∗, R) = L(T, a∗, R).
Then Cr(T, a∗, R) = L(T, a∗, R) ⊂ Cr(T, a∗, R∗) = ⋃
R′∈C(T,a∗,R∗)
L(T, a∗, R′) ⊂
L(T, a∗, R∗). So we have g(m′T , s
∗
N\T ) ∈ L(T, a∗, R∗) as required.
Step 2 g(SN(µ,R)) ⊆ F (R) for all R ∈ L(A)N .
Let a∗ ∈ g(SN(µ,R∗)). We will show that a∗ ∈ F (R∗). There are three
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possible cases to consider. First, assume that (1) applies and m∗ ∈ SN(µ,R∗)
is such that (ai, Ri, di) = (a∗, R, 0) for all i ∈ N . As a∗ ∈ F (R), if we
show that Cr(T, a∗, R) ⊂ L(T, a∗, R∗) holds for all T ⊂ N then by coali-
tional monotonicity we conclude that a∗ ∈ F (R∗). Let a′ ∈ Cr(T, a∗, R) for
some T ⊂ N . Consider the strategy m = (m′T ,m∗N\T ) where m′i = (a′, R′, 1, 0)
for all i ∈ T . Then by (2) g(m′T ,m∗N\T ) = a′. Since m∗ ∈ SN(µ,R∗) we have
a′ = g(m′T ,m
∗
N\T ) ∈ L(T, a∗, R∗). As this is true for all a′ ∈ Cr(T, a∗, R) and
for all T ⊂ N by coalitional monotonicity a∗ ∈ F (R∗).
Assume (2) applies and m∗ ∈ SN(µ,R∗) is such that (aj, Rj, dj) =
(ai, Ri, 0) for all j ∈ T i, i ∈ {1, . . . r} and (aj, Rj, dj) = (ai, Ri, 1) for all
j ∈ T i, i ∈ {r + 1, . . . , k} and g(m∗) = a∗ ∈
r⋂
i=1
Cr(N\T i, ai, Ri). Let
R ∈ C(N, a∗). If we show that Cr(T, a∗, R) ⊂ L(T, a∗, R∗) for all T ∈ 2N\{∅}
we conclude again by coalitional monotonicity that a∗ ∈ F (R∗). Let a′ ∈
Cr(T, a∗, R). If we show that a′ can be obtained by a deviation of T then
we have a′ ∈ L(T, a∗, R∗) as m∗ ∈ SN(µ,R∗). Suppose T deviates and says
(a′, R′, 1, n′) where R′ ∈ C(N, a′) and n′ is the highest integer announced. Then
the outcome is in the intersection
r⋂
i=1
Cr(N\T¯ i, ai, Ri) where T¯ i’s are the new
coalitions which are formed after the deviation of T such that everybody in
each T¯ i announces the same message with di = 1. As a
∗ ∈
r⋂
i=1
Cr(N\T¯ i, ai, Ri)
and N\T i ⊂ N\T i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , r}, we have a∗ ∈
r⋂
i=1
Cr(N\T¯ i, ai, Ri).
Also note that T ⊂ N\T¯ i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , r}. So now for each i ∈ {1, . . . , r}
we have a′ ∈ Cr(T, a∗, R) and a∗ ∈ Cr(N\T¯ i, ai, Ri) where T ⊂ N\T¯ i.
Then by the transitive criticals condition we have a¯ ∈ Cr(N\T¯ i, ai, Ri).
As this is true for all i ∈ {1, . . . , r} we have a′ ∈
r⋂
i=1
Cr(N\T¯ i, ai, Ri) and
g(m′T ,m
∗
N\T ) = a
′ ∈ L(T, a∗, R∗) where m′i = (a′, R′, 1, n′) for all i ∈ T . Hence
by coalitional monotonicity we conclude that a∗ ∈ F (R∗).
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Assume (3) applies and m∗ ∈ SN(µ,R∗) is such that di = 1 for all i ∈ N
and g(m∗) = al where l = w(m∗N). Let R
k ∈ C(N, ak) be the profile announced
by agent k. Note that every agent can make the outcome anything in the
alternative set by announcing that alternative and an integer higher than nl.
Then we have Cr(T, al, Rl) ⊂ L(T, al, R∗) = A for all ∅ 6= T ⊂ N and by
coalitional monotonicity al ∈ F (R∗).
Condition of common criticals is obviously weaker than the condition
of unique common criticals and hence, also a necessary condition for im-
plemetability. However the modified condition of preservation of criticals is
not a necessary condition:
Example 5. Let A = {a, a∗, a′} and N = {1, 2}. F : L(A)N → 2A is
defined as follows:
F (R) =

a′, if a′ is top ranked by 1 and 2
a, if L(a,R) = A
a∗, if a∗ is top ranked by i and a∗Rja for j with i 6= j.
First we will show that F does not satisfy the condition of preser-
vation of criticals. Let R,R∗ be profiles such that a′R1aR1a∗, a∗R2aR2a′
and a∗R∗1aR
∗
1a
′, a′R∗2a
∗R∗2a. Note that F (R
∗) = a∗, F (R) = a and a′ ∈
Cr(1, a∗, R∗), a∗ ∈ Cr(1, a, R). But a′ 6∈ Cr(1, a, R). So F does not satisfy the
condition of preservation of criticals.
F is strong Nash implementable: Consider the following mechanism. Mi =
{m,m′,m∗} for all i ∈ N and g is defined as follows where the rows represent
agent 1:
m m′ m∗
m a a a
m′ a∗ a a′
m∗ a a a∗
It is left as an exercise that µ = (M, g) implements F .
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CHAPTER 4
SUFFICEINT CONDITIONS FOR SUBGAME
PERFECT NASH IMPLEMENTABILITY
In this chapter we consider subgame perfect Nash implementability. We iden-
tify a subset of implementable social choice rules via critical profiles. The ideas
presented here can be viewed as a first step towards a full characterization and
the design of different mechanisms for subgame perfect implementation.
4.1 Notation and Definitions
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a nonempty finite set of agents and A be a nonempty
finite set of alternatives. A preference profile is an n-tuple, R = (R1, . . . , Rn)
where each Ri is a linear order
1 on A which represents agent i’s preferences
on A. The set of all linear order profiles on A is denoted by L(A)N . A social
choice rule (SCR) is a mapping F : L(A)N → 2A which assigns to every linear
order profile R ∈ L(A)N a subset of A.2 The graph of an SCR F , is defined as
Gr F = {(a,R) ∈ A× L(A)N | a ∈ F (R)}.
An extensive mechanism with simultaneous moves is a 5-tuple, µ = (X,>
1A linear order is a complete, transitive, reflexive, antisymmetric binary relation.
2We will assume that F is onto. In general, all the results continue to hold if we restrict
F to the image of F .
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, D, δ, g), where X is a set of nodes, > is a partial ordering on X that represents
precedence, D is a set of possible decisions, δ is a one-to-one function that
labels each non-initial node with the last decision taken to reach it and g is a
function that associates to each terminal node the outcome that is obtained at
this node. At each non-initial node all agents know the entire history of the
play and they move simultaneously. Mi =
∏
x∈X\Z
Mi(x) is the message space
for agent i where Z is the set of nonterminal nodes and Mi(x) is the set of
messages for i at the node x. The joint message space is M =
∏
Mi. For each
m ∈ M and t ∈ T , let g(m, t) be the outcome when agents use strategy m
starting from node t. An extensive game mechanism µ constitutes an extensive
game at each preference profile R ∈ L(A)N .
m ∈ M is a Nash equilibrium for (µ,R), if for all i ∈ N ,
g(m; t0)Rig((m
′
i,m−i); t0) for all m
′
i ∈Mi.
A Nash equilibrium m ∈ M for (µ,R) is subgame perfect if for all i ∈ N ,
g(m; t)Rig((m
′
i,m−i); t) for all m
′
i ∈ Mi and for all noninitial nodes x. Let
SPE(µ,R) denote the set of subgame perfect equilibria of the game (µ,R). A
social choice rule is implementable in subgame perfect equilibria if there exists
an extensive mechansim that implements it, i.e., if there exists µ such that for
all R ∈ L(A)N , g(SPE(µ,R); t0) = F (R).
4.2 The Result
We introduce two new conditions via critical profiles which are related to
the conditions of common critical and preservation of criticals from Chapter 3.
We show that together with Maskin-monotonicity these conditions are suffi-
cient for subgame perfect implementability. The mechanism used is also based
on critical profiles.
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Theorem. An SCR F is subgame perfect implementable if it is Maskin mono-
tonic, satisfies the condition of preservation of criticals and the condition of
common criticals.
Theorem. A social choice rule F is subgame perfect implementable if it is
Maskin-monotonic and satisfies the following conditions:
i. For all T 1, . . . T k ⊂ N\∅ such that ⋃
i
T i = N , for all (ai, Ri) ∈ Gr F such
that Ri ∈ C(N, ai) with L(N\T i, ai, Ri) = Cr(N, ai, Ri)\Cr(T i, ai, Ri)
one has
⋂
i
L(N\T i, ai, Ri) 6= ∅.
ii. For all b ∈ L(T, a,R) such that R ∈ C(N, a) and R is defined as in (i),
and for all R′ ∈ C(N, b) one has L(i, b, R′) ⊂ L(T ∪ {i}, a, R).
Proof:
Stage 1: Each agent announces a pair (ai, Ri) ∈ Gr F . If there exists (a,R) ∈
Gr F such that (ai, Ri) = (a,R) for all i ∈ N , then implement a. Otherwise
go to Stage 2.
Stage 2: Group the agents that announce the same alternative. Let
T 1, . . . , T k ⊂ N\∅ be the groups that announce the same alternative, i.e.,
aj = ai for all j ∈ T i. Each agent announces a critical profile defined as
follows:
If j ∈ T i then j announces some Ri ∈ C(N, ai) with L(N\T, ai, Ri) =
Cr(N, ai, Ri)\Cr(T, ai, Ri).
Each agent i ∈ N also announces a non-negative integer ni. Consider the
intersection I =
S⋂
i=1
L(N\T¯ i, ai, Ri). Now, if there exists a unique common
critical a∗ for {(N\T¯ i, ai, Ri)}Si=1 then implement a∗.
Otherwise implement a∗ ∈ I where a∗ is the most preferred alternative of
the agent who announced the highest integer in I. Ties are broken in the favor
of the lower indexed agent.
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F (R) ⊆ g(SPE(µ,R)) for all R ∈ L(A)N . Let a∗ ∈ F (R∗). Consider the
following strategy m∗ ∈ M : m∗i (1) = (a∗, R∗) for all i ∈ N and m∗1(2) =
(b, Rb), m∗i (2) = (a,R
a) for all i ∈ N\{1}. Any unilateral deviation only at
Stage 2 will result in outcome a∗ as the game will not reach that stage. In
other cases, i.e., if an agent i deviates at both Stage 1 and 2 or only at Stage 1,
the outcome will be a1 ∈ L(i, a∗, R∗) by the construction of the mechanism.
Therefore, no agent can be better off by a unilateral deviation and hence
a∗ ∈ g(SPE(µ,R∗)).
g(SPE(µ,R∗)) ⊂ F (R), for all R ∈ L(A)N . Let a∗ ∈ g(SPE(µ,R∗)), i.e.,
there exists m∗ ∈M with g(m∗) = a∗ and m∗ ∈ SPE(µ,R∗).
First assume m∗ is such that m∗i (1) = (a
∗, R) for all i. Then g(m∗) = a∗.
Let x ∈ L(i, a∗, R). If agent i deviates and announces x at Stage 1 and
announces the highest integer at Stage 2, then one of the cases in Stage 2
will apply. As x ∈ L(i, a∗, R), x ∈ L(T, a∗, R′) for all possible announcements
of agents other than i. So x will be in the intersection I. Then either x
is the unique common critical for the reached collection, or as i announced
the highest integer, x will be the outcome. As m∗ is equilibrium at R∗ then
x ∈ L(i, a∗, R∗). This is true for all i, so by Masking-monotonicity a∗ ∈ F (R∗).
In other cases by using a similar argument to the one above and to the
argument used in the proof of the sufficiency result of strong Nash equilibrium,
we obtain the result. 
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
In the previous chapters we explored the relation of monotonicity and critical
profiles to implementability. We began by identifying the self-monotonicity
of the Nash equilibrium concept and determined the monotonicities that are
inherited by Nash implementable social choice rules which are not necessar-
ily self-monotonicities. We showed that the Nash equilibrium concept has a
unique self-monotonicity which is carried over to the social choice rule via the
mechanism that implements it. As there may be several mechanisms that im-
plement a social choice rule and several equilibria at each preference profile the
unique self-monotonicity of the Nash equilibrium concept may induce several
monotonicities for the social choice rule. The self-monotonicity that is car-
ried over by Maskin-Vind type mechanisms, which are commonly used in the
characterization results of Nash implementability, turns out to be the essential
monotonicity of Danilov.
We then looked at the strong Nash equilibrium. In situations where coop-
eration among agents is likely, it is more appropriate to use strong the Nash
equilibrium for implementation. We gave a new characterization of strong
Nash implementable social choice rules via critical profiles. The definition of
critical profiles was modified so that it applies to coalitions and we determined
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the critical alternatives for each coalition at each profile. We introduced three
new conditions for social choice rules; coalitional monotonicity, preservation
of criticals and unique common critical. When these conditions are combined
with Pareto optimality, they characterize social choice rules that are strong
Nash implementable. We introduced a new mechanism for the sufficiency part
of our result where each agent’s message space consists of the alternative set
and the critical profiles for each alternative.
Monotonicity and critical profiles are essential concepts for implementabil-
ity. They are not only important for identifying the rules that are imple-
mentable in a solution concept but also very useful to design new mechanisms
for implementation. The generality of the applications, supports the idea that
implementation theory can be cast in terms of monotonicity. With further
research, the identification of monotonicity structures and critical profiles will
be sufficient to answer most implementation and mechanism design problems.
This unified approach will allow us to have a better understanding of the re-
lation between various problems in the field.
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